Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as`chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system from the agents' preferences and a voting rule. The dynamics form a one dimensional statistical mechanics model; this suggests the use of the topological entropy to quantify the complexity of the system. We formulate natural political social questions about the expected complexity o f a v oting rule and degree of cohesion diversity among agents in terms of random matrix models|ensembles of statistical mechanics models|and compute quantitative answers in some representative cases.
The input for many mathematical models of social, political and economic systems includes a list of preference orders, one for each agent in the model. These preferences are aggregated, respectively, by some social welfare function, or voting rule, or market mechanism. More than 200 years ago, however, Condorcet recognized potential problems with voting rules, namely that aggregation might produce cycles 1 . For example, suppose that there are three alternatives fa; b; cg and three voters rank them in the orders a b c by which we mean a is preferred to b which is preferred to c, b c a , and c a b . Give n a c hoice between b and a, a 2:1 majority prefers a; if they are o ered the opportunity to switch from a to c, again a majority will vote to do so; nally, a majority also prefers b to c, completing a cycle.
While this example may seem contrived, Arrow's celebrated theorem 2 states that among an apparently reasonable set of voting rules, the only ones which do not encounter peculiarities of this sort for some pro le list of preference orders are dictatorial, i.e., they depend only on the preference order of a single, speci ed, voter. Taking the example seriously then, we conceive it as describing a sequence of states the successive preferred alternatives, a situation which is naturally modelled as a dynamical system. A similar perspective was originally suggested by Saari 3 ;  in this letter, motivated in part by potential applications to autonomous machines 4 choosing new states from a sequence of alternatives, rather than analyzing the situation by analogy with dynamical systems, we construct an explicit map from a pro le and voting rule to a discrete dynamical system. The usual model for a preference order is a relation, denoted , which i s complete for all pairs of alternatives a b or b a and transitive if a b and b c then a c 2 . When a b and b a, the voter with this preference order is indi erent between a and b; when only a b, s a y , the voter strictly prefers a and we write a b. We consider aggregation formalized by maps f from preference proles p to directed graphs f p . A directed edge a b in f p indicates that for pro le p the map f chooses alternative a over alternative b. We call f a voting rule if for all pro les p, f p is complete or a weak tournament 5 for all pairs of alternatives a b or b a in f p and Pareto or unanimous if a b in each preference order in p then a b in f p . Notice that for every alternative x, since x x in every preference order, x x in f p for every pro le and voting rule.
The weak tournament for the pro le and majority voting rule of the example in the rst paragraph is shown on the left in Fig. 1 ; we omit the edges connecting each v ertex to itself.
We have motivated the introduction of weak tournaments by an example of what is essentially an amendment procedure 6 , i.e., successive pairwise votes between a new alternative and the current one. Notice that this de nition of voting rule is actually a generalization of the more familiar one which requires the outcome to be a preference order on the set of alternatives. Such an outcome corresponds to f p being transitive as well as complete and Pareto. But Arrow's theorem 2 , for example, says that a broader de nition is necessary if we forbid dictatorial rules and impose the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives IIA|that the relation between a and b in f p depend only on the relations of a and b in the preference orders in p 7 . In fact, the broader de nition applies equally well to voters whose pairwise preferences are not necessarily consistent, i.e., transitive.
The directed graph which is the image of a voting rule f on a speci c pro le p denes a symbolic dynamical system: Suppose the voters are presented with a sequence of alternatives|an agenda, by extension of the usual meaning to allow arbitrarily long sequences. The results of successive pairwise votes between the new alternative and the current one form a sequence of symbols representing the chosen alternatives. The possible sequences are exactly the directed paths in f p , e.g., for the rst example in Fig. 1 , baacbbaccc : : : are the rst 10 symbols of an admissible sequence path in f p 1 . For contrast, examine the second example in Fig. 1 , obtained by applying the same majority voting rule to the pro le p 2 = a b c; c b a; c a b. An admissible sequence path in f p 2 can start the same way: baaccccccc : : : , but once alternative c is chosen, no other alternative can beat it; the sequence terminates with a string of c s. It is clear that the space of admissible paths on f p completely characterizes a pro le voting rule pair. This space, together with the shift map deletion of the rst symbolof a sequence forms the promised dynamical system|a one-sided subshift of nite type 8 .
In Fig. 1 , the rst set of admissible sequences seems more interesting complex than the second. To quantify this perception we enumerate the admissible sequences which are periodic with period N: De ne the transition matrix F p by F p ab = 1 if a b in f p and F p ab = 0 otherwise. Then the number of N-periodic sequences is the trace of F N p . It is easy to check, for example, that 6 = Tr F 3 p 1 Tr F 3 p 2 = 3; more generally Tr F N p = N 1 + + N k when there are k alternatives and i are the eigenvalues of F p .
The thermodynamic formalism 9 provides a physical description of symbolic dynamical systems. Observe that
where A is the set of alternatives and, with the convention that N+1 1 ,
T is the partition function for a statistical mechanics model on the lattice Z N where the set of states is A and the energy E f p of a con guration 2 A N is the sum of contributions from adjacent states: 0 i f i +1 i in f p and 1 otherwise. The zero temperature T ! 0 limit in Eq. 1 eliminates the contributions from all but the ground state con gurations, so the number of ground states and hence Z N f p ; 0 is the same as the number of admissible N-periodic sequences. From this perspective it is particularly natural to consider the free energy density the average energy per lattice site or equivalently, the topological entropy 10 : S f p : = lim
Inserting Eq. 1 into Eq. 3 we see that S f p = log f p , where f p is the spectral radius of F p , namely its largest eigenvalue.
The topological entropy measures the degree of mixing of the dynamical system dened by f p . When the entropy is positive the dynamical system is chaotic and exhibits the familiar features of chaos: topological transitivity, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and a dense set of periodic points 11 . For the examples of Fig. 1 , we can compute S f p 1 = 1 using logarithms in base 2 and S f p 2 = 0, which suggests that the presence of a cycle in f p makes the dynamical system chaotic. This is true in general:
PROPOSITION. The dynamical system de ned by a complete directed graph has positive topological entropy i the graph contains a nontrivial cycle.
Proof. If the directed graph has no nontrivial cycle there is some ordering of the vertices for which the associated transition matrix is upper triangular. Hence all its eigenvalues are 1, so the topological entropy vanishes. Conversely, suppose there is a cycle of length l 1 in the directed graph. Considering only those paths which lie entirely on the cycle, at each vertex of the cycle such a path may stay there or continue to the next vertex. Starting from any vertex on the l-cycle, then, there are 2 N such paths of length N, which may require at most l , 1 additional steps to close. Thus S lim N!1 log l2 N =N = 1 . Since Arrow's theorem 2 guarantees the existence of cycles for any nondictatorial IIA voting rule and some pro le on at least three alternatives, positivity of the topological entropy demonstrates the connection between Arrow's theorem, cycles and chaos hinted at by the`chaos' theorems in spatial voting models 12 as well as by Saari's suggestive analogies 3 . We therefore propose to use the topological entropy as a measure of the complexity of a pro le voting rule pair. It identies the associated dynamical system as chaotic or nonchaotic and quanti es`how chaotic' the system is. Consider the pair of pro les p 3 The rst type of ensemble we consider is generated by a random distribution of pro les. For a given voting rule, the statistical mechanics model de ned by Z N f p ; T will be present in the ensemble with probability proportional to the number of pro les with the same image under f. For example, again consider the situation of majority v oting on three alternatives.
There are 3! 3 pro les for three voters with strict preferences, out of which 2 3! map to a weak tournament with a cycle as in f p 1 . Thus for a random ensemble over these pro les, the average entropy for majority rule is to nd that the average entropy for majority rule on four alternatives goes up to approximately 0.391.
We can also consider the same ensembles of pro les aggregated by other voting rules.
The Borda count 18 , for example, assigns weights of n , 1, n , 2, : : : , 0 to each voter's rst, second, : : : , last preferences, respectively, sums the weights of each alternative, and ranks the n alternatives accordingly. Since there is now the possibility of alternatives with equal ranks, even though the resulting weak tournament is transitive, it may still contain cycles 19 . For three voters the average entropy for the Borda count on three alternatives is log 3 1 18 + 1 1 6 0 : 255, while on four alternatives it is log 3 1 18 + 1 37 96 0:473.
For comparison, we may use the Copeland method 20 to make the weak tournaments obtained by majority rule transitive: assign each alternative a w eight which is the number of incoming minus the number of outgoing edges and rank the alternatives accordingly. For three voters the average entropy of the Copeland method on three alternatives is log 3 1 18 0:088, while on four alternatives it is log 3 17 144 + 1 5 96 0:239, each of which, although higher than for majority rule, is lower than the corresponding average entropy for the Borda count.
The second type of ensemble is generated by a random distribution of voting rules. We consider, for example, a uniform distribution of rules which satisfy IIA and have image in the set of strict tournaments. Strict tournaments are weak tournaments with exactly one edge between every pair of vertices. Each such voting rule is de ned by its images on the pro les restricted to all pairs of alternatives. For a pair of alternatives there are 2 n possibilities for the restriction of a pro le of n strict preferences. The voting rule maps each of these to an edge directed one of two ways between these alternatives in a strict tournament. Since voting rules are Pareto, the two unanimous restricted pro les have xed images, but the remaining 2 n , 2 m a y b e mapped, independently, to either directed edge.
Thus, if there are k alternatives, there are 2 2 n ,2 k 2 possible IIA voting rules for n voters. Although this forms a huge ensemble of maps f, given a pro le p, it is straighforward to determine with what probability each statistical mechanics model Z N f p ; T occurs in the ensemble. Restricted to fa; bg or to fb; cg this pro le is unanimous, so every voting rule, being Pareto, must map p 5 to a strict tournament with the edges a b and c b. The other pairwise restrictions, however, are not unanimous. Since we are considering an ensemble of IIA voting rules, this means that a c or c a, a d or d a, b d or d b, and c d or d c are independent events. Furthermore, since the voting rules in this ensemble map pro les to strict tournaments, each of the 16 resulting possibilities has probability 1 16 . No further analysis of the ensemble is necessary; we can immediately observe that with with probability 3 16 the strict tournament to which p 5 maps has a 4cycle like f p 4 , with probability 5 16 it has a 3-cycle like f p 3 , and with probability 1 2 it is transitive. Thus, using the entropies in Eq. 4, the average entropy for p 5 This shows that the average entropy over an ensemble of voting rules is a plausible measure of the cohesion or diversity in a society 21 , as described by a pro le: When the number of pairs on which the pro le is unanimous decreases, the average entropy increases. Furthermore, it is sensitive to which pairs the voters rank consistently. It is clear that for this IIA ensemble, unanimity o n t w o disjoint pairs, e.g., fa; cg and fb; dg, does not reduce the entropy from the value found for p 3 and p 4 .
Taking a statistical mechanics approach to a general problem in social dynamics 1,2,6,12,21,22 |iterated preference aggregation|we have been led to the topological entropy as a quantitative measure of the complexity of pro le voting rule pairs. Unlike traditional approaches which h a v e concentrated merely on the existence or not of cycles, use of this quantitative measure allows comparison between systems di ering even in numberofvoters or alternatives. Furthermore, we h a v e constructed an annealed random matrix model for voting and considered ensembles corresponding to two natural social political questions: What level of complexity can we expect from a given voting rule? How cohesive diverse is the system relative to some collection of voting rules? The rst question has been addressed in previous work by evaluating the probabilities for the existence of a Condorcet winner or of a nontrivial cycle 15, 16, 17, 23 . Such probabilities are inputs into our calculations of the average entropy for a given ensemble of pro les and voting rule. Our approach to the second question is a strong generalization of the usual analysis of the nonexistence of a cycle for a single voting rule. Not only does the topological entropy provide for quantitative answers to these questions, it also makes precise the connection between the existence of cycles and chaos. Increasing the number of autonomous agents or the number of alternatives increases the complexity of the system; chaos can be reduced or avoided only by c hanging 23 or severely restricting 2,6,21 the class of agent preferences and or aggregation rules.
